Hellard:[taped turned off and on] Go ahead.
:Let us assume that we—let us assume that the two institutions are merged and
the same assumptions might apply if you were going to put all the eight or nine institutions under a single governing board. You know, what effect is that to have on the operation of the universities? What will be taken away from what and what will be added unto what? And that is why I go back, whenever one talks about merger or a single governing board, I ask the question, “For what purpose? For what purpose?” I have seen all kinds of systems operate in different states and I’ve see—seen no clear evidence that any one system of governance is especially superior to other systems.Hellard:Well, isn’t the argument made, and I’m not saying I make this, but isn’t
the argument made that it’s first of all more economical and second would allow a higher quality of performance?:Well, those arguments may be made, but I’ve never seen them either as proved or
disproved. I think some states have very high quality of higher education that don’t have single governing boards and some states that have do—that do have single governing boards do not have the highest quality. And you have all sorts and conditions of governance. You have with three systems of governance— system, the state university system, and the state college system. The state universities used to be colleges, , I don’t know what else, there’s a whole host of them. And then you’ve got a bunch of community colleges. Some community colleges in will have 50,000 students. You know, we talk about community colleges in—in it’s a totally different thing from what it is in large urban states. You know, we—we’ve got only one community college that’s comparable to those and that’d be Jefferson Community College and it’s small in comparison with some of those. My son lives in , they’ve got a community college there with 10,000 students in it. Everybody attends it, my wife—my son’s wife goes, she takes courses there. She’s a graduate of , but she goes there for particular courses—art courses, things like that that she wants, maybe fashion design. I don’t know. You know, I—I’m not—I—I don’t reject the notion of changing the governance, I just say I think you don’t want to put the cart before the horse. I want to know the—I see no reason to believe that it would be more economical, unless you had some program that—that merger would put into effect that would create such economies. You know, are you still going to have an English department in both universities, are you still going to have an engineering school at both universities? If you’re not, which one’s going to give it up? You know, the at the of is a totally different kind of institution from the of at the . The of at the of is different from the of at the . You’ve got two law schools, one at each university, and I doubt if under any merger plan the two would wan—would be consolidated. And how would they differ under merger? How would the medical colleges, how would they be different? How would the medical centers be operated differently? I mean, to decide whether they would produce economies or more efficient operation you’d first have to decide what you were going to do rather than what administrative structure we’re going to adopt. I—I have—I have come to—to hear at least that in a state like North Carolina what the consolidated university system has done is given continued dominance, ’cause it was always dominant, to the Chapel Hill campus. But the campus was always dominant before you had a single university system. Of course, they went through it gradually. They had—they originally had separate universities, they had—and—and then they were consolidated back in the ’30s, I believe, into—and the Greensboro campus and the different campuses were made parts—Raleigh—they were all made parts of the University of North Carolina system, good many years ago. Then back in the ’60s or ’70s East Carolina and were brought in and then you had a single, unitary system. But there isn’t any doubt that has had the cream. Now would that—if you merge the of and , where you only had the two campuses, would that change the balance of forces or leave them where they are or reverse or just reinforce the present? I don’t know. And wouldn’t the same divisive issues that occur now occur even—even after a merger, except in a new forum? And then the appointment of trustees and regents would become a much more controversial matter. Is this regent pro—pro or pro ? I just don’t know.Hellard:Is the Council on Higher Education effective?
:Not now.
Hellard:What—what—what are the weaknesses?
:Well, it doesn’t—it—it doesn’t exercise the authority it’s got. That’s its main
weak— weakness now is it—well, there’s certain structural weaknesses, one is it’s too big. The legislative action in the 1982 general assembly greatly weakened the structure of the Council, it politicized it, it undertook to spread around appointments from various districts and various alumni, various institutions, made it a much more partisan oriented body. And it’s got seventeen members now, which is about twice what it ought to have. It functioned far more effectively when it had nine members. I think the staff has been buffeted by legislative rebuffs and institutional rebuffs to the point where the staff has lost much of its effectiveness. Many of the people, some of the staff, have left, others are hanging on only ’cause they can’t find any place to light. I think the oomph is out of it. I don’t think the council members or the council staff now feel that they’re on the cutting edge of anything. The legislature used to show them tremendous respect, now I think the legislature regards them as kind of a whipping boy. That’s partly their own fault because they haven’t exercised the power that they have. They have—they have been timorous—timorous with the institutions particularly.Hellard:Is your eye hurting?
:No. I don’t know, what—what do you think the general perception of the Council
is now?Hellard:Oh, I think it’s—the general perception is that it’s just there.
:That’s right.
Hellard:Just there.
:That’s right.
Hellard:But I’m not sure, now speaking from a—from a—you know the standpoint of
the general assembly, I’m not sure the general assembly ever understood what the council was supposed to be.:Ever what?
Hellard:Ever really understood what it was supposed to be all about.
:That’s probably true too. What do you think they thought it was supposed to be?
Hellard:Well, I don’t think—I don’t think—I know they—a coordinating body that
could make universities step into line.:Well, it could have been that.
Hellard:Bring some degree of order to the courses, the workload, that was
offered by universities which—:They had that power.
Hellard:Bring some—bring some economy to the higher education—
:Well, economy is another question, I mean, I think that’s an easy question
to—to demagogue on. I think it’s—it is true that—that the universities have not done a good job of organizing their resources effectively. The truth is that it is very hard in higher education to get institutions to do some of those things. David Reisman said years ago—and he’s been writing on this subject now for thirty or forty years, he’s quite old now—David Reisman said that you could never do any more than nibble at the edges of higher education, that it had a certain autonomy that no legislature, no governor, nobody else could to very much about, no—no board of trustees, no anybody. And there’s some truth to that. But the Council hasn’t done all it could do. They have the authority to approve or disapprove any program, graduate or undergraduate, at any university, to list it or delist it and they have seldom exercised that power. Just a few months ago they refused to delist a program—a graduate program in geography at Eastern [] or somewhere that had only there students in it. There’s a whole list of recommendations that our committee made that neither the Council nor the institutions have responded to. And we wrote them a letter last summer asking them about these things and—and they have never answered. They’re passing the buck around. I think many of the members of the Council are more frustrated than people on the outside. They don’t know what their role is. A lot of them don’t want to put the time in it. It takes a lot of time. When we had nine members the individuals—many of the individuals who had put the most time in it have been dropped from the thing. I’m not referring to myself because I wasn’t dropped, but— In fact Governor Brown wanted to put me back on after our committee had made its report and I didn’t want to go back on, thought I’d been on long enough. I was on fourteen years. I thought that was long enough. But—she took Gordon Hood off, one of the best members, she—David Grissom got tired of it. I don’t know. I think it ought to be made smaller. Of course the legislature’s cut its staff way down and that was punitive, largely. Result of the budget fight in the nineteen and—what was that eighty-two session—Hellard:Hmm.
:—or eighty—eighty-two session.
Hellard:Eighty-two.
:That fight was absolutely unnecessary. If Brown had not have fiddled away his
time, if he’d accepted the original budget when the Council sent it over, it would have passed, in my opinion. But the longer he waited the more power the regional universities built up.Hellard:How do you bring the regional universities into—into line, given the
fact that they exert such regional power in—in the legislature?:It’s very ha—
Hellard:( )
:It’s very hard and—now don’t—don’t mistake my feelings. I think the regional
universities perform a vital function, but they all want to be little UKs and that’s the problem. They—they—they’re unwilling to specialize in their roles. Each one of them want to do the same thing that every other regional university does and as nearly the same thing as the does as they can. I think they all have too many graduate programs, for example. Dr. Albright did a survey of Morehead [] for the board of regents, and I don’t know whether they paid any attention to that part of it or not, they did a—[President Herb] Reinhardt adopted a great many of his recommendations. But he recommended they reduce their graduate programs from twenty-three or twenty-four down to five. You know, at Northern [] he had only two graduate programs, business and education, and he says they could do without education now. At that time, you had a whole bunch of teachers up there who hadn’t got their master’s degrees, because they were geographically isolated, and so the education program enabled them to kind of work that—work that bubble out. But he never went in for—for big graduate—and he has a graduate center there, in which the professors from the University of Kentucky and University of Cincinnati come over and give graduate seminars on a limited basis but— I don’t know. I—I think, you see one of the things we recommended in—in our report was that the—the Council revise the mission statements of the—of the universities. We, you know, I’m trying to think when we first passed the mission statements—it in was in about 1977, that’s seven years ago—and we recommended—we rec—recommended—said it was time for a reconsideration and that we should have a more specialized role for each of the regional universities, that they shouldn’t all try to do exactly the same thing. But I don’t think we got very far. You know, in the first place—well, I don’t know. I—I think it’s very hard. I think especially Western []—Western really regards itself as having been deprived of its rightful place as the second state university. Don’t you?Hellard:Well, I’ve—I’ve never thought about that. How do you—how do they—
:They were ready to start—
Hellard:( )
:They were ready to start a law school back in the late ’60s. I don’t know.
Hellard:I—I wasn’t even aware—
:Zacharias—Zacharias talks that way. He—he lead—he carries on the crusade
against the more than any of the regional presidents. I don’t know. I have a notion that Reinhard is going to regionalize Morehead more than it’s ever been. He’s going to try to make it—make its mission more consonant with, you know, the special problems of—of the mountains. I don’t know. I hear conflicting reports about Reinhard. Some of the things he said and did impressed me as being pretty good. But some people say he’s just a publicity hound. But I don’t know.Hellard:Let’s skip over to the election coming up. Now I guess—are you going to
be in on election day or do you have dialysis on Tuesday?:Yeah. I’ll just go to vote. I may come—come in the afternoon awhile, but I’ll
have to go vote.Hellard:I thought maybe if we had an hour or so, I’d like to on Tuesday.
What—what do you—what are your impressions of this election between Mondale and Reagan? Does Mondale have a ghost of a chance?:I don’t think so. It would be a miracle. I don’t see it. I think that—I think the—
Hellard:Was he failed from the outset or doomed from the outset?
:It’s hard for me to think he was. He certainly had an uphill battle from the
outset. But it’s hard for me to think in view of the—of the views that the people took about the issues, if you look at the polls, they showed on the one hand a lot of personal popularity in Reagan and a lot of confidence in his qualities of leadership, but they showed that most people tended to differ with his direction on most issues—arms control, Central America, fairness, position of women. Most of the issues sentiment seemed to be in the general direction of the Democratic philosophy. I think that where Mondale failed was insufficiently delineating a vision of the future, in—in taking people, you know, if he kept people’s mind on the present they think of prosperity and American assertiveness in general terms and prosperity. If he could’ve got people thinking about the future and not merely pointing out the dangers of the future, but pointing out more specific differences between his vision of the future and Reagan’s—or Reagan’s nonvision—I think he might have had a chance. Did you read David Broder’s piece in this morning’s Courier?Hellard:No, I haven’t seen the Courier.
:Well, I agree with him. That Mondale symbolized all the traditional strengths
of the Democratic party, but also carried with it the baggage of some of its weaknesses and that he didn’t delineate a vision of the future that was something a bit different from the—from the past programs, but didn’t abandon their essence. Let’s take his fiscal—his fiscal policy which was the heart of his domestic— He really had a tax and expenditure program that was very vague. He didn’t embrace measures of tax reform, for instance like the Bradley-Gephardt proposal, that would have raised some more money and at the same time improved the fairness of the tax system, reduced the rates and—and I think, would have stimulated the economy. When he got to the question of expenditures and—and appropriations he was very vague and didn’t face the question of entitlements and some of the other huge items. We’re now in a position where neither party would have been in a position to deal with the budget deficit adequately or in any way that was politically possible. Reagan’s painted himself into a terrible corner. Mondale wasn’t in quite so big a corner, but he was fairly vague really. For instance, I think Mondale made a great—a great mistake in not endorsing a tax on imported oil, which would’ve broken the back of OPEC, and that could have been put in a trust fund to reduce the deficit.Hellard:[tape turned off and on] Okay.
:I think that—I think that Mondale missed a lot of his opportunities. He’s a
very decent man, good deal of integrity, and I think in many ways he made a gallant fight. But he didn’t, you know, [Gary] Hart preached the gospel of new ideas—now I’m not sure that he had so many—but it was the right message and if Mondale had brought some new ideas to the fore— One that Broder mentions is the fact that a great many Democratic governors now have had very original and very effective programs to meet challenges—new challenges—in state and local government. And he criticizes Mondale for not emphasizing more the future role of state government in the national picture. Pointing out the successes of governors like, you know, some of the southern governors and Babbitt of Arizona and—what’s the man’s name in Colorado?—Lamb in Colorado and some of the others, in dealing with—and— You know I think Broder would say, and he didn’t mention this as much, but I would’ve been—I think Mondale should have embraced federalism to a greater degree, not the phony federalism of Reagan which is designed to starve poor people and—and cut down on social programs, but one that would realign the functions of state and national governments in a more effective way with—with the financing coming through the national treasury to some degree, but leaving the states more options on—on a lot of matters with the federal government taking over things like Medicare, Medicaid and—and public assistance which really are national matters and leaving things like highways and sewers and—and problems of the infrastructure and certain types of social services to—to more, you know, block grants.Hellard:You need to flick our ashes from—
:Uh-huh. Thank you. You know, Mondale could have come with some original ideas.
I think one of the things that has hurt the Democratic party is a feeling that they want to centralize everything in a big national bureaucracy and I think the time has probably come to have the basic issues decided nationally, but to leave the actual implementation of certain of the programs to a greater degree of state autonomy. I think that would have been a new idea that Reagan has used in a phony way that Mondale could’ve used. I certainly think that he missed a chance to deal with the reform of the whole welfare system. You know, I think Reagan’s remedy is just to cut—cut programs for the poor and leave them to go pick shit with the chickens. But I think we—we don’t have a very effective and efficient system of helping the poor now. It—it’s—it’s the food stamp program and the—and the public assistance program are really too prone to perpetuate a cycle of dependency. We need some original thought about how to deal with those things more effectively to bring those people into the mainstream with more job training and— And it’s going to be expensive, you know, you don’t do it by—you’re not going to do it on the cheap. But in many ways, in the long run, we’re spending more by just perpetuating the dependency of the poor than we would be by spending more to bring them into the mainstream—through education, job training, things of that sort. We’ve got every kind of a program for poor people and it all doesn’t add up to enough to help them get out of poverty. But it’s cut around, you know, you’ve got a housing subsidy program run by one department, you’ve got food stamps run by another department, you’ve got public assistance run by another department. And in order to exist these poor devils have to get on about three programs. And I’d rather see us move—and Mondale could have said this—move toward a negative income tax concept, but tied with vocational and—and literacy training and the kinds of social services that would be better designed to bring these people into the labor market. Because until these people get more skills and get out of the poverty cycle, they’re never going to become productive because no matter how much the economy advances the demand for just totally unskilled labor, whether male or female, is not going to be great enough to give them jobs. You know, he could have come with some new ideas. Hart had a few of them, they weren’t very well fleshed out, and there was some phoniness in it, but—Hellard:Would Hart have been a better nominee against Reagan than—than Mondale?
:I—I can’t—I can’t tell. There was something about Hart just a little slick.
There was something about him that didn’t give me confidence. He’s bright, there’s no question about that. But did you ever notice that he had a way of when you asked him a question in a—in a forum he gave a nervous laugh [laughs] and—and that always turns me off.Hellard:I think I was—I was turned off more by his—by his attempt to copy Kennedy.
:Well, that’s right, that—
Hellard:It made me think there wasn’t a genuine bone in his body.
:Well, that worried me too because, you know, kept— Yes. I—I thought that
was—that was excessive.Hellard:In retrospect, was [Geraldine] Ferraro’s nomination a plus or a minus?
:Probably a plus. I don’t think it helped enough, but I think it helped. I—I can
see minuses, but I think it did—it—it—it—it changed the whole picture in—in this country. It broke a barrier and whether it was a plus or minus in this election may be debatable. I don’t think you can argue that it was a minus. I think you can argue that it wasn’t very much of a plus. It brought some enthusiasm in that had been lacking, clearly. There was a period when there was more enthusiasm for Ferraro than there was for Har—for—for Mondale and that may have been a little bit of a minus for that reason. I don’t think her financial problems made any difference ’cause I thought she handled them pretty well and—and I think most people began to sympathize with her and feel that she’d been subjected to a brutal inquisition, more than any candidate had ever had. And that probably nobody could stand up perfectly under that if you want to go back— They’re now going back to his mother and grandfather and all that kind of stuff. And I think a lot of people think that’s been unfair and punitive. I think there may be an underlying feeling that she wasn’t equipped to be president, but on the other hand I think there’s been a certainty that George Bush isn’t either. And so I don’t know whether that’s hurt as much as it might have. I think Bush has really shit in his mouth, Vic, don’t you?Hellard:Yes, of all the people in this campaign, he—he has come out worse than
any of them, I think.:That’s right.
Hellard:Roger Mudd, on national TV said he acted silly.
:That’s right.
Hellard:You know, I—I just never thought I’d hear Mudd say anything of that
nature about any public figure. But I thought it was absolutely correct.:Oh yes, I think Bush—Bush—I think in the debate his appearance was like a
spoiled boy—Hellard:And he belongs back in a fraternity house.
:That’s right, cheerleader, white shoes. And then afterwards it was even worse.
I mean the vulgarity of it. I think Bush is finished. I do not think the Democratic—I don’t think there’s going to be a permanent political realignment.Hellard:No. No, I don’t think so.
:I don’t think that at all. I think the Democrats will hold the congress, make
gains in the senate and I think in 1986 there’s a very high probability, or possibility, of a Democratic sweep. There’ll be even more—the Democrats will retake the senate in ’68, if they don’t do it this time. I think that Reagan’s chickens are going to come home to roost. I just hope to God he lives.Hellard:Lord, I do too.
:’Cause I’d rather [laughing] see Reagan president than Bush.
Hellard:Bush, absolutely.
:I say, I hope to God he lives. I think that— What—what—what do you think about
it, I mean about Mondale, I mean you—you’ve—Hellard:I’ve been disappointed in Mondale.
:Oh, so have I.
Hellard:I think he’s not—he’s not shown the kind of leadership qualities that I
had hoped he would show, he’s not been as forceful as I—I agreed with Tip O’Neill early on that he’s not—wasn’t being forceful on taking Reagan to task for the right things. At the same time, Jimmy Carter has been a hell of a load to carry.:That is correct.
Hellard:Just a hell of a load.
:Although I think in many ways Jimmy Carter’s had a bum rap.
Hellard:Oh! I don’t—I don’t disagree, but I think public perception is—
:I mean I think public perception is just what you say it is. But I think in
many ways, I mean, Jimmy Carter, his personality was his worst fault. He—he just didn’t have the personal magnetism and force, there was something kind of small about him. But if you look at the things that he actually did and tried to do. For example, Reagan’s greatest, one of the greatest benefits that’s come to Reagan, is the decline of inflation. Now the decline of inflation has been caused by three things—only one of which is Reagan’s, and that’s something he wouldn’t want to claim credit for—but the three things that have caused the—the break in the back of inflation have been—what?—decontrol of domestic oil prices—initiated by Carter—appointment of Paul Voelker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board—done by Carter—and third was the depression—caused by Reagan’s fiscal policies. Now— And I’ll add the fourth, the strength of the dollar. ’Cause the stronger the dollar is the weaker inflation is, that’s just a truism. And when we pay the price of that we’re going to have inflation again. We can’t perpetually maintain adverse trade balances and a strong dollar. And once American interest rates start to go down, the value of the dollar will go down and when the value of the dollar goes down the price of imports is going to go up. And when the price of imports go up—copper and steel, raw materials particularly—then—then the price—cost of living is going to go up. I—I think that on top of everything else though, Reagan’s personality is suited to a feeling about prosperity and national strength which may be false, but Reagan’s personality goes well with that. His personality wouldn’t have gone well, and didn’t go so well, when things weren’t going well in the economy. I really think prosperity was the one thing we couldn’t beat. This reminds me of the election of 1928, when everybody felt the Democratic party was done forever. Al Smith got eighty electoral votes and the Republicans had a big majority in both houses of congress. Two years later they lost the congress and haven’t held it but four out of the next fifty years. And I think that these chickens are going to come home to roost. But Reagan has been the luckiest president. Take the invasion, look what a lucky thing that was. I mean, I don’t say it was good or bad, but it made him look strong, made the American people feel, you know, feel like they had won something.Hellard:I—well, I think—I think that’s true ( )
:Even if it wasn’t anything but kicking a cripple.
Hellard:It made me feel like an Italian.
:Like an Italian?
Hellard:Yeah.
:What you mean?
Hellard:Well, when jumped on , it was a small—
:Oh yeah.
Hellard:—small country—
:I agree, but—
Hellard:—with no major defenses.
:—but—but it’s like kicking a cripple.
Hellard:Yeah.
:I agree. But it made the American people feel good, you know, for the first
time, you see, here’d been Afghanistan, Iran, all these reverses, Poland—we couldn’t do anything about that—neither did Reagan, I mean, that happened during his administration and he couldn’t do a damn thing about it and I don’t blame him for it, I mean, any more than Carter. I asked, the other day, a fellow named Tony Solomon and his wife were down here visiting the Kincaids—Shelby Kincaids. He was a friend of their daughter Alice in . He was Undersecretary of the Treasury under Carter and president of the Federal Reserve Bank in , he’s just retiring this year. And he’s a very bright man. A liberal Democrat. And he was in the Johnson administration. I said, “Tony, what do you think are the two biggest mistakes that Jimmy Carter made?” And he was a Carter supporter. He said I think the first mistake he made was not to slow down the fiscal expansion early in his administration when we were already on the road to recovery and we should have pulled back on the budget deficit, moderately. He said the second biggest mistake he made was that after the students—when they first captured the embassy in —he says the government was very nervous in about it. The government didn’t instigate that he said. They were more or less propelled by the students, you know, “I must follow the mob because I’m their leader” that type of thing. He said if in the very first twenty-four hours we had told the government to get those people out of the embassy and turn them over to us or else we would bomb all their tankers, he says they would have given us back the people in the embassy and would—at that time they wouldn’t have killed them. The government would have gone in and got them out. I thought that was interesting.Hellard:Yes, it is.
Prichard:He thinks we wouldn’t have had as much inflation if he’d slowed down on
expansion of the economy in the—in the early part of his administration and that we wouldn’t have had the humiliating— And, you know, the Iran embassy situation was enough to beat Carter by itself.Hellard:Absolutely.
:I mean, that just killed him. And, as he said, you wouldn’t have had to bomb
their cities, you wouldn’t have had to bomb civilians, but if you had just said, “If—if we don’t have them back in forty-eight hours or twenty-four hours, we’ll bomb every one of your tankers.” And they couldn’t have stood up under that. I—I think he may be right. I think probably one other thing, he should have probably decontrolled domestic oil prices sooner than he did, but—Hellard:But nonetheless, he was a burden.
:Oh, of course he was a burden because the people, as you said, the perception
people have is more important than the reality. And the perception they had was a weak and ineffective leader. And of course this is Reagan’s greatest asset, is the perception people have, whether an accurate perception or not, of Reagan as a strong leader.Hellard:Decisive.
:Decisive. Now, I say, and the thing helped that and it did it at little cost,
you know. We lost few lives and—and— But as you say, it’s like kicking a cripple. It’s no—there’s no—Hellard:Well, how was the situation with ( )? Well, I’m not—I’ve got to leave.
We’ve been here two hours now.:Well, what do you think—what do you think’s going to happen in the next
session? Do you think we’re going to have any legislation of any consequence?Hellard:I don’t look for the governor to present much of a package.
:She didn’t have any package the other time.
Hellard:No and she’s not going to—she’s not going to come with a tax package again.
:Then what else can she come with?
Hellard:You know she—it’ll be totally irresponsible for her to impose programs
with no money to pay for them.:That’s right. Now, you know, I think—
Hellard:( )
:—as far as—as educational reforms that don’t cost money, we have probably done
about as much of that as we can do in the last session. We got accountability or much greater degree of accountability and I think that’s good. But I don’t think that’s enough and I don’t think that—that you can do many other big things without big ticket appropriations. And you know as well as I do, that education is not the only need of state government that’s been starved. Indeed, in some ways it’s been starved less. The social services have been cruelly treated. I mean, we’re actually spending less dollars on the social services than we spent four years ago and that’s not true of education.Hellard:I would be surprised to see a legislative initiative for a tax raise—to
increase—of any kind.:Why, you know—
Hellard:Unless it comes—unless it should come from—from Clark or [Mike] Moloney.
:Well, Moloney has consistently told me— What do you believe Mike’s relationship
with the governor now?Hellard:I think decent. They’re not bosom buddies I don’t think.
:Enough to get Larry Roberts appointed Commonwealth’s Attorney? I mean, to get
Barbara Edleman appointed Commonwealth’s Attorney?Hellard:Did Larry resign the thing?
:He’s going to resign. I think he did resign today. He was going to.
Hellard:I heard something on the news this morning about that.
:Well, it was a piece in the Courier predicting it.
Hellard:I—I don’t think that, no, I wouldn’t think he’d have that kind of clout.
:I always thought it was an uneasy relationship. He doesn’t like her.
Hellard:No.
:But he had a much better relationship with Brown than he’s had with most any governor.
Hellard:What—what reason is Larry going to resign? Do you know?
:Going into private practice. I imagine one of these firms has made him an
offer. What do you— But anyway, Larry is resigning.Hellard:Strange. I—I thought he would stay there until he got ready to run for
Attorney General and then go out a flying, or try to.:I wouldn’t want to see that.
Hellard:I—nor would I.
:He’s a Moral Majority man.
Hellard:That is—I thought that was his ploy nonetheless and it may still be his
plan, I don’t know.:Well, I don’t know why he’d resign from this if he wanted to run for Attorney
General. I mean, there’s—there’s no particular reason to think that this would—wouldn’t be as good a springboard to Attorney General as private practice.[end of interview]
1:00