Hellard:Tape number twenty-four of the interviews.
:Do you want to tape this?
Hellard:I sure do.
:How you been, Vic?
Hellard:Been very well, very well.
:You’ve gotten relaxed after the session?
Hellard:Yes, I took off a couple of days this week and—
:Did you go away?
Hellard:—laid around home. Well, I went down to right after—during the veto break.
:Did you get some sun?
Hellard:I got some sun; I burned myself to death.
:Where’d you go?
Hellard:Down to .
:Uh-huh.
Hellard:Went down in one day and stayed there one day. It started raining on us
and we came back home. How you been doing?:I’ve been fine, just fine.
Hellard:I’ve been reading about you in the—Ed Ryan’s column.
:What I said to Brown?
Hellard:About the prayer of power.
:Uh-huh. Well, I did tell him that.
Hellard:What do you think about his race?
:I don’t believe he’s going to win it. I—I—I never underestimate him. I—but I—I
don’t believe he’s quite got it off the ground and flying.Hellard:Don’t you think it’ll—if—if he doesn’t win it might tarnish his chances
to be governor again?:Well, that’s right he may—he took a big risk. I think he would’ve been in a
very strong posi- —and I told him this, Vic, when he called me. I said, “John, I think you’d be in a very strong and almost invinc- —invincible position.” And this I, you know, I think that’s why Steve [Beshear] is being so active in [Walter “”] Huddleston’s campaign, frankly, one of the reasons.Hellard:That would make sense.
:Did you hear Steve last night?
Hellard:No, I did not.
:He was just superb. He was—I never heard a better performance. He was
articulate; he wasn’t at a loss; he didn’t fudge—or didn’t seem to fudge—on anything. He was very discreet in the things he said and yet you got a sort of impression—you know, they asked him about Martha Layne and he was very tactful, but, you know, he neither embraced her nor—nor put her down. He—he talked about a number of issues and I thought he just did extremely well.Hellard:Well, Bill Phelps was saying the same thing.
:Bill heard it then?
Hellard:Yes, yes.
:Well, Lucy [] and I listened and we were very much impressed. I don’t know
anybody—I don’t know what big—how big an audience he had—but I don’t know anybody that could’ve got more out of an appearance of that length than he did out of this. I thought he was just first rate.Hellard:Well he’s a very capable man.
:Well, Steve has a—has a good intellect, I mean he, you know, he—he—he has a
very able mind and he’s articulate and he doesn’t give the impression of being hesitant. He’s tactful—I don’t mean that he just blunderbusses into—into unnecessary controversy—he’s very tactful about that. But he doesn’t give the impression of being hesitant or of fudging. And they asked him if he wanted to be governor and he virtually said yes. You know, said, “Yes,” said, “certainly that’s in my plans.” And—Hellard:Who were the panelists?
:Oh, well, it was primarily, you know, Osborne, and then there—there were a
couple of others there. I forget. They weren’t—they were not as good as she was. She’s pretty good.Hellard:Yes, she is.
:And—he’s a—he’s a very able— Don’t you think he came through the session in
pretty good form?Hellard:Absolutely.
:I thought probably came out with a bigger plus than any major figure.
Hellard:Absolutely.
:Any major figure.
Hellard:I—I—I know—I don’t know—I don’t know of one blunder he made.
:Uh-uh.
Hellard:Not one.
:And—he—
Hellard:And he spent his time making friends.
:Uh-huh. He sure helped us with the Optometrist Bill.
Hellard:( )
:Huh?
Hellard:Haven’t got your match on it.
:Got it now?
Hellard:Yeah.
:He sure helped us. Sent it to Benny Ray Bailey’s committee.
Hellard:Well, Steve took a much more active role in—in—
:Uh-huh.
Hellard:—in those affairs than Martha Layne [Collins] did.
:Oh yes. And he helped us with some senators. We were in a terrible shape in the
house, primarily because of the network that Brongus—Brongus had built up. You know, they start out with that hard core of the Louisville delegation and then there were a lot of people that either voted for it or didn’t vote because they thought that it was going to pass anyhow and they thought they’d kill it in the Senate and— You think they’ll come back with it again next session?Hellard:Absolutely.
:I think they will.
Hellard:Yeah. Well I thought we’d talk today—go back to Julian Carroll at the
end of his administration. We’ve already pretty much discussed him, but I don’t think we really got into the primary between [Terry] McBrayer, Carroll Hubbard, Brown, and [] Sloane.:Uh-huh.
Hellard:You know I thought that was a fairly interesting race.
:I’ll be glad to talk about that.
Hellard:I know you were—you were somewhat associated with Sloane—
:I was very active in Sloane’s campaign.
Hellard:Had you all anticipated Brown’s entry into the race, or did it really
come as a surprise?:Well, from the time he married, it didn’t come as a surprise. Before that, I—I
think probably people thought that it was going to be like it was in—you got this turned on?—Hellard:Oh, yeah, we’ve been turned on a long time.
:—turned on in 1972. You know, when he waited till the last minute and then
didn’t run. And I had tended to think that he might just give it some thought and give it a pass and then make up his mind not to do it. But once he married Phyllis [George] and it became evident that she, you know, had a major role in influencing him, I thought he was going to run. And, you know, it was like many of his decisions. It may not have been thought out carefully; it may not have been planned with precision; but it was—it was one of those strokes of—not just luck, but of choice—that come to him at times. He got in the right race at the right time. Nobody had emerged as a clear winner. There was a sort of a stalemate. McBrayer started out as a great favorite, but it was apparent that McBrayer was not moving ahead into a clear winner’s spot and the others were struggling to catch up and pass him and Sloane was making strong gains but hadn’t emerged as a clear winner. All our polls indicated that, that it was a very close race between McBrayer and Sloane when Brown got in and there were still a good many people that hadn’t made their minds up. And Brown got into a race that had a lot of people in it. It didn’t require a majority vote or even a heavy plurality to win. And he—he mobilized his strengths very effectively in that respect, particularly, I think, appealing to the soft voters who maybe were leaning toward other candidates, but not strongly committed and above all the kind of people that don’t ordinarily vote or take much part in those primaries. What I called then the “ooh and aah” vote—they, you know, the beauty operators [laughs] and the—and the nonpolitical, nonvoting people who were sort of bedazzled by him and Phyllis. And he very skillfully appealed to them and he won with 28 percent of the vote. And it was a remarkable performance in many ways and yet an understandable one in retrospect. And we knew—we knew he was likely to win, you know, for a week or two before the—before the primary. Peter Hart was calling me every day and saying if we can’t make a breakthrough Brown’s moving up and is going to win it. And so I was not surprised at his winning, you know, actually on election day. The money he was able to put into it was a key factor. And he spent—I don’t suppose there was ever that much money spent, Vic, in that short a time. It was all highly concentrated—massive television, the phone banks which were very expensive, the letters from Phyllis to all these people—all of them were very effective.Hellard:In retrospect, could have done anything to have altered the outcome?
Should he have done?:If he has I—if he could I don’t know what it was. We didn’t think of it then
and I’m not sure I have thought of it later. The only thing could have done would have had to have been done earlier. If somehow he could have moved dramatically into a leading position before Brown got going, I think he could have stopped Brown. But I—he hadn’t done it. And it was very hard to make an issue or—or—or espouse issues or—or deal with issues that would have made the difference. And—and I don’t know how—how he could’ve done it.Hellard:What about the other candidates: Ralph Ed Graves, George Atkins, and
Carroll Hubbard?:Well, of course I think George—George Atkins was a key figure in Brown’s
victory and I don’t think that Brown perhaps could’ve won without George Atkins coming to his assistance. It was not so much the votes that George had, because the polls all indicated he was running very poorly, but it was the momentum. Ralph Ed Graves had even fewer votes. Ralph Ed had none to speak of. But the momentum of their getting out and being for Brown, I think was a critical factor in getting his show on the road. I don’t think there’s any doubt of that. The affect of Hubbard, I’m not sure. I—I don’t—I don’t know that Hubbard—Hubbard’s candidacy affected any one of the candidates any more than any other. If Hubbard hurt any candidate the most it was probably Thelma Stovall, who dropped so dramatically, you know. When the race started she was in the lead on all the polls I saw. She ended up running below Hubbard. Not only below Brown, but below Sloane, below McBrayer, and below Hubbard. And I’m bound to think that—I suspect that in she hurt Sloane. I expect that, you know, she did get some labor votes in that probably hurt Sloane. Although Sloane did run extremely well in those wards. He carried that end of and he carried and so in some respects her decline helped Sloane some. But to the extent that she got votes in—in the area, I suspect that it probably hurt Sloane more than it hurt any of the others. because McBrayer, who had all the elected officials in for him, got only 8 percent of the vote as I recall.Hellard:Any—any speculation as to why Hubbard chose that particular time to run?
:Oh, I—
Hellard:Anybody who knows him has no question to his ambitions, but it just
seemed like such an inopportune time to do what he did.Prichard:I think he thought Julian Carroll was—he the thought the grand jury was
going to put Julian Carroll in great trouble and create a great series of scandals and that that would benefit him because he had been the fellow that asked for the grand jury and the fellow that did a lot of the talking about Julian’s administration. You know, Sloane was rather careful in his campaign not to run just as an anti-Carroll candidate. He—he was critical in some ways, but he didn’t—he didn’t really— And after the race Julian told me that Sloane of all the candidates in race, except Terry of course, was less offensive to him than the others. Now maybe Sloane made a mistake in that respect. Now you asked me if I thought he could’ve done anything else. Would he have run better if he had made it a stronger anti-Carroll campaign in an overt way? And I don’t know. It may have been. But on the other hand, Sloane got a lot of votes from people who thought he had dignity and was constructive and had not run a negative campaign. So he might have had to pay too big a price for what he picked up by running as—as—as a more of an anti-Carroll candidate. And then Sloane’s great handicap was his inability to raise money. You know, I don’t suppose there was ever any money—more money spent in a gubernatorial campaign than Terry McBrayer spent that year. Not all of it reported by any means.Hellard:What was your first contact with John Y.? Did he kind of—did he approach
you before the—before the primary, before his entry into the race?:Oh, I think he called me once, but he knew I was committed to . You know, I was
honorary chairman of ’s campaign. I was his chairman in . I’d been on the stump. I don’t think he really thought there was any chance. And he and I had very little contact. I think he made a courtesy call to me.Hellard:This was after the primary?
:No, before.
Hellard:Before the primary.
:Oh, after the primary I went down the day after the election to his
headquarters to pledge my support and he was very gracious of course and welcomed it and said he wanted me to help him. And I did advise him considerably during that campaign. [Laughs] He—he was—when Louie Nunn—when the first question of debating Louie Nunn camp up, Brown was a little nervous about debating him and Brown wanted me to debate him instead of him. He said I want you to be my spokesman in this campaign and come in the headquarters. Well, I wouldn’t do that, you know, I—I said—I said, “Johnny, it would be demeaning to you to have to have a spokesman.” I said, “You would—you would hurt yourself if it looked as if you were afraid to face Louie Nunn.” And I helped him some in preparing for the debate and— But you know the thing was never in doubt between him and Nunn. He had a lot of Republican support as well as Democratic support and I don’t think anybody bolted of any consequence. It was really—the party really pulled together for Brown, you know, in the fall.Hellard:What about some of the people that Brown had around him as governor,
like [Frank] Metts?:Well I think Metts was a, if you’ll forgive me, a shit ass. I don’t think
everything Metts did was bad. I think when Metts initially went in the Transportation Cabinet he probably did some—some useful things. He—he—he, like Brown, wanted to do, you know, eliminated a lot of excess personnel. He—he cut out some abuses. He closed some of these garages that probably needed to be closed. It was unpopular politically. He probably improved—he improved the relationship—improved it in a kind of an ironic way between the Highway Cabinet and the—and the contractors. They had always had the inside track and sort of had a cushy relationship with the—even with some of the engineers over there. And I think Metts broke a lot of that up. He—he reduced the cost of road building by doing that. But I think he carried everything to excess. He handled the layoffs in a very brutal and insensitive way. He got into, you know, it was perfectly all right for him to cut down Bill May’s commanding stature and presence in the highway program, but he went beyond that. He decided to conduct a war to the death with Bill May and I think he overdid it. And in the end it—it sort of exploded in his face. I—I think he was the same way with a lot of the engineers. I mean he was just— And he became ambitious himself to run for governor. He thought he could become a major political figure and he had no political talent. And he became so controversial, even inside the administration, that his effectiveness grew less. And Brown continued to feel that he was just great. And Brown put him in charge of the Corrections Cabinet, which was perfectly horrible, and put him in charge of the housing program, which may have been all right, I don’t know. But Brown—until Metts fell out with him—Brown thought Metts could do no wrong. And then when Brown told him not to run for governor, he got mad at Brown and has had no use for him ever since.Hellard:What about Bob Offutt?
:Oh, well, he’s crazy. You know, when they first appointed Bob Offutt I thought
it was fine, you know, he’d been Revenue Commissioner back in [Lawrence] Wetherby’s administration.Hellard:Let me get it for you.
:He was a professional and I thought that was a good, nonpolitical, professional
appointment, but, hell, he was crazy. Again, he eliminated some of the shady—Hellard:Got it?
:Uh-huh. —things over there, but he—he just went wild. And I’m not sure he
wasn’t crooked. You know there was some evidence when he had some fellow here as an undercover man, you remember?Hellard:Yeah, ( ).
:And there was some evidence that—that—that fellow was not only a crook, but
that Offutt maybe was on the take with him. There was some very strange— That fellow took polygraph tests, you know, he said he was shaking these people down and splitting it with Offutt and he took a polygraph test and that showed he was telling the truth. Now, I don’t know whether you can believe all polygraph tests, but Brown certainly was wise to get rid of Offutt. And when he got rid of him and put Ron Geary in it was one of the best moves that he ever made. because I think Ron Geary was outstanding. Just an outstanding Revenue Cabinet Secretary and one of the best people Brown had. Bob—Brown after he shook things down and—and settled down, Brown had a good cabinet. Certainly you—I think we never had a better Finance Secretary than Bob Warren. I think that Ron Geary was outstanding. I think Grady Stumbo did a very good job. I think he—I think he had some weak spots. The tax department was never very well run. Transportation Cabinet after Metts left did all right, but I always thought that [James] Runke pretty much let Metts call the shots. I think when he finally got Leonard Marshall in as Banking Commissioner he—he had a—he made an excellent commissioner, and Danny Briscoe was an outstanding appointment. Pretty—pretty—pretty honest administration and it was pretty effectively run. Brown didn’t want to work and so when he had good people in the cabinet he had a good administration because he let them run their show. When he had people that weren’t so good in the cabinet—like maybe Metts—he didn’t do so well.Hellard:What about people like Welch, Neil Welch?
:Oh, that’s a strange situation. I think Brown just kind of went off on a—on a
show. You know, that was a show proposition—bring a big FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] man down and clean things up. And I think Brown had an idea that he was going to uncover all kinds of corruption. And, you know, I think Welch was, you know, almost psychopathic. And Welch scared everybody to death, told the legislators he was going have all their tax—or maybe Offutt was the one that did that.Hellard:Offutt—Offutt did that.
:But Welch was—he was—indicated he was going to tap the wires of the legislators
maybe. And then, well, you know, what he did down there with Metts and Bill May shows that he had no judgment.Hellard:Was he always show or was it—was—did he ever get to—to enjoy Brown’s confidence?
:Oh, I think he enjoyed it at first, but I think Brown got turned off of him
pretty quick. When he got in that ruckus with George Wilson, I think Brown began to get turned off of him.Hellard:What about George Wilson?
:I think he did a pretty fair job. George is not a, you know—you know, he
wouldn’t rate as the top administrator in state government, but I think he was probably as good as you’re apt to get in the Corrections Cabinet and he’s a very honorable, decent fellow. You know, it’s—it’s the most thankless job you can have in government. Nobody is interested in the welfare of the prisoners, nobody cares anything about it and—and you’ve got these court orders that restrict and command you. And I think in—in the light of the problems he had to contend with George did all right. He certainly was not bad. I don’t know that I’d call him a stellar performer, but I’m not sure you could’ve found a stellar performer for that job. But I think—I think it was a good cabinet.Hellard:What about the legislatures that John had to contend with?
:Well, of course he emancipated them in his first session and never was able to
undo the emancipation. I—I think that, you know, things had been moving in the direction all the time of some greater degree of—of legislative independence. And when Brown took a hands-off attitude toward all leadership matters and more or less told them to go run it the way they wanted to run it, I think he—he probably gave away more than he needed to. I think it would’ve been possible to have a middle ground approach in which he relaxed somewhat the form of control that governors like Julian and [Wendell] Ford had exercised and [Bert T.] Combs and even [Edward] Breathitt. But I think that—I think that the—the legislature’s got to be led by somebody. You know, it can’t just function as a mob. And if it’s going to be led by somebody, it’s either going to be led by a governor or by its own leadership or by the lobbyists. And I think the—the balance shifted to the lobbyists. I think the balance shifted to the lobbyists. I think the—and to a kind of a populism in which legislators came under increasing pressure to succumb to the least—least common denominator, you know, whoever yelled loudest at home. I think that that was obscured in the 1980 session by the fact that, though they may have had some differences, that Brown and Bill Kenton—don’t you think?—had a good working relationship, even though they may not have agreed always on everything.Hellard:Oh yes sir. Yes.
:And I think that enabled Brown to get through the 1980 session because you had
a leadership in the legislature that could deliver certain things to the governor. When you got to the ’82 session Bill was gone, Bobby was new, and I don’t know that Bobby ever had the strength as a speaker—or ever will have—that Bill Kenton had. And consequently the internal leadership—[David] LeMaster was a new face and not what I’d call a dominating figure, a decent, fine fellow. So really when you got to the ’82 session there—there just wasn’t anybody that could handle the legislature. The senate’s always a little bit different. The senate is a little more, if I may say so, responsible and—and balanced in things and—and—not that they’re perfect—but his problems I think, Vic, were with the house rather than the senate most of the time. And, you know, you had some strong people in the senate, probably developing strength, and he probably had more allies in the senate than he did in the house. You know, Mike Moloney was a strong ally.Hellard:Uh-huh.
Prichard:But I think we’re in now in a period of interregnum in the relationship
between the legislature and the governor and somehow we’re going to have to strike some kind of a balance now, some— I just don’t think we can have government—effective government—in Kentucky if the leg- —if the governor is impotent in dealing with the legislature. Now that may be the governor’s fault as much as the legislature’s. Because we haven’t had a governor for a while that’s had very much skill in that direction. I don’t think Governor Collins showed it. I—I don’t think Brown showed it. And the last one that showed it was Julian and Julian had too much of it.Hellard:But of course it started getting away from him in the special session of ’79.
:Uh-huh. That began—began—
Hellard:And in the Senate.
:Yes, but see, he was on—by that time he was a lame duck.
Hellard:Right.
:He was a lame duck. And any governor that has a special session during a heated
primary in his last year in office is bound to—to have some vulnerability. But with all that, he did get by in that session.Hellard:Going back to the Brown administration, what—what do you think was his
most—most remarkable or memorable achievement?:Oh, it’s hard to say. I would think the elimination of a good many abuses of
patronage and corruption, number one. Number two, being able to attract some very able and new faces to his cabinet that were effective in running their cabinets. Three, I think his response to the fiscal crisis was fairly responsible and—and good. I think he showed a sort of instinctive or residual ability to take the right stand on a number of issues. I thought he was right on right to work. I thought he was right on—on the nursing home reform. I thought he was right on the weight distance tax. I think he was right on the management of state investments and funds. I think he was right on the reform of insurance. I think in a great many of those things. And then there was an intangible factor. There was a great deal of phoniness to his economic development program. I don’t think he accomplished a hell of a lot there and I don’t know that it was possible to accomplish a hell of a lot there because we had a recession, number one. Number two is there’s a limit to what a governor can do in going out and attracting industry. That’s a—that’s a matter that economic forces decide to a certain degree, but— And that largely—that was something he put a lot of stock in, but I don’t think his record—record on that will stand as a monument. But I think he did do something else. With his lifestyle and his—his way of getting publicity—there was a lot that was embarrassing about it and a lot that was sort of phony and razzle-dazzle about it—but it did probably make the rest of the country feel a little more interested in Kentucky. And it probably made Kentuckians feel a little better about being Kentuckians and I think that’s a considerable achievement.Hellard:Do you think that—that Kentuckians, by and large, find John Y.’s
lifestyle attractive?:I think that’s very hard to assess. I think in many ways they do not. But I
think there are some people in Kentucky—and they’re mostly as I said nonpolitical people, people that are not ordinarily interested in issues, not ordinarily interested in—in the fundamental problems of government, who are rather superficial in their own thinking—and I think to those people perhaps the glamor of that lifestyle is a bit appealing, Vic. You know, I—I—I see—I see that. You know, in the same way that they’d be attracted by Elvis Presley or they’d be attracted by any glamorous figure, they’re attracted by John and Phyllis, or at least interested by them. There’s some sympathy with that and lots of curiosity. I think on the other hand there were a great many people in the state—the more serious people, the people interested in—in issues and in public affairs and I don’t by jus-—that just mean the—the people that were trying to make a buck or the people that were trying to—to get something out of state government, but people that have a serious interest in state affairs—who were to some degree turned off by his superficiality and shallowness. And—and they looked upon the lifestyle of the Browns as sort of vulgar and ostentatious and as inclined to divert attention from the more serious affairs of government. So it’s hard to say on balance.Hellard:Well, of course we could talk about the constitutional—
:Yes, I just thought of that. The succession amendment?
Hellard:Well, the succession amendment or Brown v. R.I.C.
:Well, the succession amendment I think was a political, probably disaster, for
him. I think he felt— You know, he’d gotten puffed up. He began to feel that he could do anything. That because he won that race he was magic in . And the succession amendment could’ve been passed as easily as anything if he just hadn’t put himself in as a beneficiary of it, Vic. I begged him in that session when they picked it up. I said, “Governor,” I said, “this ought to be passed, it—it—it can be passed, but if you put yourself in there you create an issue that will in my judgment destroy it.” He wouldn’t listen. And so he went out and he spent money, they raised money, they put on a campaign and it was defeated disastrously and I think it was a set back for him. I think it probably did much to take away from the magic of Brown as a fellow whose name always meant a winner and victory. But it was not a fatal wound.Hellard:Well what about the constitutional officers Brown served with? Most of
them we’ve been over because most of them have been around for a long time—:Most of them have been around for a long time, and most of them—most of them
were a dis- —a lot of them were just a disgrace to the state. A lot of them were just, you know, a caricature of what had been going on for forty years—Francis Jones Mills, Drex Davis, Jim Graham—I mean, it was—it was ridiculous. The exceptions of course were Steve, who made a quite acceptable attorney general. I don’t think Steve necessarily shone at his best in his performance as attorney general. He was a little cautious, but certainly he was not discreditable in any way and caused no embarrassment to—to the governor or to the state. I think Martha Layne [Collins] was a total blank—just running for governor. And she very effectively went out and—and used that post to—to build her strength especially in the rural counties, by personal contact at the expense of the taxpayer. But as far as exerting any force or any influence or playing any role in the affairs of the state, she was minimal. [Alben] Barkley was an embarrassment, you know, that litigation. I’m not sure whether it helped Brown or hurt Brown, whether it helped Barkley or hurt Barkley, but by the time it was over and after Barkley got involved in his peccadilloes, I think it was, you know, it pretty well eliminated him a major factor—possibly a major factor—in state politics. And I think it was kind of a nuisance, kind of a pimple on Brown’s cheek, but I don’t think it had any major affect on him. I don’t know, that’s—I guess that’s what I’d say about the constitutional officers. Who was the treasurer? Drex?Hellard:Drex.
:Yeah, that’s right.
Hellard:He had a running battle over—
:That’s right. Drex was a nuisance and Drex was just a tool of the banking
interests and—Hellard:Let’s talk about Grady Stumbo for a minute.
:Sure.
Hellard:He is an interesting person. I thought a very attractive candidate.
:I fi- —oh, he was an extremely attractive candidate.
Hellard:I think now with all of his—questions about his financial arrangements starting—
:I think he’s been hurt badly.
Hellard:But nevertheless, someone who appeared to be very capable.
:I think he is very capable. I think he’s very bright. I think he has a good
deal of charisma. I think he—he has a populistic appeal. I think he has, as a mountain boy that has done some service to his people and shown some dedication to his people, he has an appeal at different levels. I think he not only has what I called a minute ago a populist appeal to—to the common man, I think he also, by his brightness and his evident intellect and to a certain degree by his dedication, has an appeal to much better informed people—to, you know, intelligent people. And I think he attracted a great deal of sympathy and attention in his race and he had more dynamism than any candidate in the race. No question about that in my mind. He had a more dynamic affect as a candidate and ran a remarkable race. I think the—the way he—he financed his campaign—I don’t think that he—I don’t think that he really thought he was doing anything wrong. I think he was given very bad advice by people that he relied on who—who simply were ready to cut corners and—and I think in—in—he was badly misled. Interestingly enough as it reflects on his own ethos—Hellard:[Coughs] Excuse me.
Prichard:—he could have done the same thing through setting up a PAC [Political
Action Committee] and he rejected that because he thought it was—even though legal—was not in accord with the spirit of the law. And yet he was persuaded to do something else which probably violated the letter of the law. I think there was a certain innocence about it. I don’t know what motivated Howard Norell, I’m not that close to him. I don’t think he’s exactly what I’d call an innocent. But Mr. B.F. Reed was as innocent as a lamb in all this. I think he absolutely wanted nothing except just to have a mountain boy that he’d known all his life and had tried to help the people up there be elected governor. And I think he’s a very rich man; he’s eighty-six years old. I don’t think he had anything in the world that he wanted from Grady Stumbo. But it—it obviously skirted the edge of the law. And I think that Benny Ray Bailey—I—I don’t blame Greg Stumbo as much because Greg is a pretty honorable boy. But I think Greg just persuaded himself that what he wanted to believe was—was the law. But I think Benny Ray Bailey and John Wells and people like that— You know, and—and Grady was like many people in those tough situations. He—he ended up believing what he wanted to believe and what he was persuaded by his advisors was all right. But I have no doubt that it’s had a bad affect on his standing with the people. And I think in many ways that’s regrettable. And maybe he can overcome it. But it set him back and perhaps deservedly so. I don’t think he willfully violated the law, but I think he relied—he was willing to believe what he wanted to believe.Hellard:How did he manage to garner so much support from—from labor in such a
relatively short time?:Oh, I think—
Hellard:When one of his opponents, Sloane, had been working on it for years and years.
Prichard:Yes, but Sloane—labor made a—labor made the crucial issue Sloane’s
willingness to say—to make a commitment—that he would veto a right-to-work bill. And Sloane—and Sloane responded with a refusal to make that commitment and at the same time put it on grounds that made it seem that he really gave serious consideration to the—to the merits of a life to—right-to-work bill. And I think that the labor people thought they had him in a corner and, you know, in my judgment they were unwise to press him the way they did and he was unwise to respond in the way he did. I—I—I—I urged him not to do what he did and told him that he would regret it. And that’s what put Grady in the race. Grady could not have been a serious and formidable candidate if he hadn’t done that. And the labor people have been hysterical about right to work. They know that it’s—exists in—in a number of southern and western states and they don’t want to have a breakthrough on the right to work. It’s clung at twenty states for a number of years. They fought in and beat it and they were determined to beat it in . And when Grady took that stand they were a very effective force in his campaign. They got out to the precincts better than I’ve ever known labor to do in the last twenty or twenty-five years. It wasn’t just an endorsement. It was something that carried through to the working people, and I suspect the recession had something to do with that. They thought they were making a last stand. And I will say this, as far labor’s strategy was concerned, it impressed people enough in politics with their force so that you heard nothing about right to work [Knock on door] in this session. Yes ma’am. Yes sir.[recorder turned off]
Hellard:We’re back on now.
:Don’t you think that they—that the force that labor exerted for Stumbo had an
impact in this session?Hellard:Absolutely. It showed me something I’d never seen before.
:Right.
Hellard:I’d never really seen labor— You know, most of my adult life I’ve heard
labor talk and talk and talk—:But they never delivered much.
Hellard:—but they never delivered. And I think they delivered.
Prichard:They delivered and—and you can see it in the counties, you know, that
all over the state from the United Mine Workers in the east to the people down at—at the Union Carbide plant in Paducah that are scattered all over those counties—Hellard:What—
:And they showed some force in the Mondale thing in these caucuses. You know, he
ran pretty well here considering that about all the organization they had was labor. I thought it was rather remarkable that the governor really didn’t have an undisputed sway over these caucuses. Uncommitted probably led, but it was a minority.Hellard:Well, you notice in—in —
:, they were split. There wasn’t one vote difference. I wasn’t there, I had to
be at the hospital, but I was told it was something like fifty, you know, fifty votes for—for Mondale, fifty votes for uncommitted, fifty votes for Hart. And—and—and I’ve forgot what there was for —forty-eight.Hellard:But it came out, I think, a five, four, four—
:Uh-huh.
Hellard:—split, which means that she only got five of the nine.
:That’s right.
Hellard:Or five of the thirteen.
:Five of the thirteen.
Hellard:Which didn’t do a lot of good.
Prichard:She— Well, in the sixth district they unhorsed her—her man for chairman
of the convention, put a black in, professor out at the UK [University of Kentucky] Law School.Hellard:Is it just that she doesn’t choose to exert any leadership or is she
still finding her way?:I’m—I’m not sure she knows how. I think she knew how to run, Vic. I think she
knew how to stroke people and get them to be for her for governor, but I don’t think she has ever addressed herself or is even very capable of addressing herself to the problems of leadership as governor.Hellard:So not only the state will suffer, the party will suffer.
:I’m afraid of it. Of course, the party suffered under Brown. I think one of the
things I most hold against Brown is that he cared nothing about the Democratic party as a party. I think he had a couple of good chairmen that—that—that worked hard and I think was particularly rather effective as a chairman. But Brown didn’t give him much help and when—and same way with Paul Patton who worked hard, but Brown—Brown never cared. When Don Mills ran for congress, Brown never made a personal donation of twenty-five cents to his campaign.Hellard:Is Don Mills through?
:I would think as a candidate, yes. I’m sorry, but I think it’s true.
Hellard:What do you attribute Brown’s lack of interest in the party and party
affairs to?:Why he’s—he thinks of politics as a vehicle for his own personal glory. And I
think unless it affects his glory—like the telethon or something of that sort—I don’t think he cares. I don’t think he has any idea of what the party is all about. I don’t think he knows anything about the principles of the party. I don’t think he knows anything about the traditions of the party. I don’t think he knows anything about the issues. I think the party is just something he can use to be elected something himself or to get himself in the limelight. And I sound like an enemy when I say that, but I think that’s just a cool judgment. I think that he’s— You know, it’s like what Colonel Breckman said about David Thornton’s father. He said, “I never knew whether Mr. Thornton belonged to the church or the church belonged to Mr. Thornton.” [Hellard laughs]Hellard:Well, in his race for the Senate, he certainly faces an entirely
different circumstance than he did in his governor’s race.:First place, he’s running head and head with somebody. Second, it’s somebody
that, in a way, he may not be a dynamic or a dramatic character, but he’s—he’s been entrenched and he’s—he has a lot of support among the interests that are strong in —the tobacco people, the farm people, the coal people, labor. Labor’s endorsed [Walter “”] Huddleston. Now whether they’re going to be as dynamic as they were for Stumbo, I don’t know, but they’ve at least endorsed . And he’s got whatever Sloane can do for him in , which is still considerable. He’s got— The interesting thing to me is the—is the fact it’s the first time I’ve ever known Mike Moloney and Steve Beshear to be apart. And I’m not sure how much Mike’s going to try do for Brown. Maybe is physical condition precludes it, but—Hellard:Well, of course it could be that Beshear and—and Moloney are apart. You
know I mentioned to you before about Rouse and Green.:No, you didn’t.
Hellard:One would always go one way—
:Oh, yeah, yes.
Hellard:—and the other would always go the other way, and they’d be apart, but
they’d still be together.:Oh, I think that’s true. Oh, I don’t think that Steve and Mike are too apart in
any personal sense, no. I think Mike is very much for hoping Steve will be the governor and—and, you know, Steve was his protégé. He—he backed Steve for the legislature and wasn’t that originally sort of a Kenton-Moloney fight?Hellard:I believe it was. And of course all that came to an end with the gerrymandering.
:Of course, they—they took care of each other and came to an end with the
gerrymandering and of course came to a more final end with Kenton’s death, but— By the way, I hear Carolyn’s in real trouble.Hellard:Well, I hadn’t heard much about that race, but I have heard that—that
[Ernesto] Scorsone is working very, very hard.:Oh, he is working hard and he’s raised some money.
Hellard:Name recognition is going to be his big—
:Big problem. Big problem.
Hellard:Scorsone just—
:His name recognition, as far as it exists, may be even adverse, sounds peculiar—Scorsone.
Hellard:Uh-huh.
:Certainly her name is well known, no question about that. She was not much of a
force in this session, was she?Hellard:No, no.
:Is she timid?
Hellard:Oh, I think she’s—no, she’s not timid, not at all.
:Well, she’s not—very untimid in—in personal contacts, but is she timid in the legislature?
Hellard:I think she’s just still trying to find her way. The power structure was
somewhat, you know, undecided this time, as we discussed.:Uh-huh.
Hellard:Leadership races are coming up, that’s very much up in the air. I think
maybe she was more cautious than anything else. What—what thing—what program do you think of that Governor Collins got through the legislature this time?:She had no program, except her tax program, and that didn’t go through. She had
no other program. It’s the first governor I’ve known that didn’t have some package of measures, some—some set of measures. Some can have a whole lot, some can have a few—but I never knew a governor that didn’t have four or five things they wanted to get done. And as far as I know she had none. You go look at her message. Was there a single—was there a single thing other than education that she mentioned?Hellard:She alluded to prisons, corrections.
:Well—
Hellard:But just alluded to them.
Prichard:—that—that had—that was a thing that federal court order made—sure
prisons and jails, but that, you know, she didn’t get anywhere on that. And that—that was something that any governor would’ve had to deal with. Hell, when you’ve got a court gavel over head you—you certainly got to—to try to do something about it. I never thought she was deeply concerned with it though.Hellard:I think I’m going to cut it off there, Mr. Prichard.
[end of interview]
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