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Hellard:This is tape number seventeen, no, tape number sixteen, of the Edward F.
Prichard interviews, on the 14th day of June, 1983. Okay, Mr. Prichard, let’s talk today about the administration of Bert T. Combs [1959-63]. What did that administration mean to ?:Well, the thing that remains most vividly in my mind as a recollection of the
significance of Bert Combs’ administration was that it—it typified the era of growth and forward movement that characterized the ’60s. It was a period of prosperity, growing prosperity. We—when he was elected in 1959, we were just emerging, or beginning to emerge, from a—from a recession. And beginning in ’60 and ’61, the tide was turning, and we had the longest period of uninterrupted non-inflationary growth in the history of the country, at least in the modern history of the country. This had very, very dramatic repercussions for state and local government. State government in had been straightened and—and deprived fiscally in many ways all through the period after World War II. I don’t mean there wasn’t any growth in the old sources of revenue. And we did have a state income tax, which was somewhat sensitive to the economy. But as we had some inflation in that period that tended to make the tax more regressive and less responsive to economic changes and the—except for the two-cent gasoline tax enacted under Governor [Earle] Clements’ administration, and except for the modest increases in the income tax enacted during the [Lawrence] Wetherby administration, after the passage of the so-called “salary” amendment to the constitution, which I believe was passed in 1949. But those were not—well, the gas tax was major, and it did provide—and this probably was one of the heritages of the Clements administration—it did provide a, a really massive rural road program in the context of its time. But that program had been in effect now for ten, eleven years, and the real pressure was across the board in—in the need for services. Education very much so. Education we were way behind, our teachers were in terrible shape, many of them were leaving to go to other states. We were—our universities were, you know, growing, but didn’t, hadn’t had much physical growth or much expansion of their physical campuses. Our social welfare programs had been niggardly, to a great extent because of the shortage in the revenues. Well, in the nineteen and fifty-eight session of the legislature, there was a strong move developed to submit a bond issue to the vote of the people for the purpose of paying a bonus to the veterans of Kentucky, all wars—course, principally, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, but they—I guess there were a few from World War I that got it too. Anyway, everybody in the state that was fiscally responsible was horrified by this. and of course Governor [A. B. “Happy”] Chandler’s administration, under the pressure of Dr. Martin and—that’s J. W. Martin—and some of the others in the, you know, that were in there—was Clyde Reeves in there then, I don’t know. But several of the holdovers that—from the first administration, that had financial responsibility—and I think Happy himself probably felt that way. But they were scared to try to kill it. So they figured the way to kill it was to tie it to a sales tax, which Happy had always hated, and which he’d thought the people would never vote for. Well, so the legislature tacked the, put it on the ballot, and provided it should be financed by a sales tax. And it was generally assumed that the amount of money it would take to amortize that bond issue was about one percent tax. Well, that went on the ballot in November 1959, after Judge Combs had been nominated and when he was running for reelection against Mr. Robsion. Combs was somewhat on the defensive in that campaign, not in any real sense, but in the sense that he had committed himself to great improvements in education, great improvements in highways, great improvements in economic development, great improvements in higher education, all across the board he had promised what you might call a progressive program. And the question was asked by his opponent, “How are you going to finance it?” Indeed, that was even asked in the primary. And he ducked and dodged. But at one point in the November campaign, he did make a declaration that he would not embarrass himself by making an irresponsible commitment on questions of revenue, that he had seen other governors, like Governor [Simeon] Willis, greatly embarrassed by those commitments, Governor Chandler. But he then told all the things he would do before he would ever consider any taxes. Now, he never said a word about sales tax. He said the he would, you know, fire useless employees and get rid of drones—he first coined the word “drones” in that campaign—and all those things. Well, the—the—that effort to square the circle worked. Robsion never really took the cudgels up and he wasn’t a very effective candidate. And Clements had done a magnificent job, which I’ve described to you, you remember, in a past interview—Hellard:Yes.
Prichard:—of going out in the counties and wheeling and dealing with the
Chandler people, who would have had to lead a bolt if you were going to have one. And unquestionably bolted, and thought he was going to lead his troops, but Clements had captured his army and took it into camp, and so Happy was totally ineffective. In addition—well, you know. But Clements saw ahead of time—Clements was a very far fi-, sighted, sage person in many ways, very practical. And of course Combs’ natural inclination was to think that this bonus was crazy, and that this bonus was irresponsible, which in many ways it was. Well, Clements gave him a talking to like a Dutch uncle. He said, “Now Bert, I don’t want you to come out for this bonus.” He said, “I don’t what you to—I don’t want you to get hooked on it in the public domain.” Said, “That’d make the Courier-Journal mad, make the newspapers mad, all the thinking people in the state mad.” But he said, “You just let some of us go out through the state, particularly in the mountains.” Because that’s where the sentiment—Hellard:Uh-huh.
:—was greatest, you know, that’s where you had the unemployment, it’s where you
had the poverty. He said, “Just let some of us go out and pass the word that the—that the botch, watch word is ‘Bert and the Bonus,’ Because,” he said, “in the first place it’ll make you thousands of Republican votes in the—” I don’t know whether it was then called the eighth district or the fifth, but it was the big Republican district down there. Well, Bert didn’t. First place, I don’t think it made any difference whether Bert repudiated it or not, Clements would have gone ahead [Hellard laughs] and done it and, hell, I helped him do it. I was disgusted by it, but I helped him do it, because I saw the—you know, he said, “If they pass the bonus, it’ll save your administration, because,” he said, “you can then put on a sales tax sufficiently high to finance your educational program and your—and your park program and your other things you want to do to develop the state.” And he said, “You can always say, ‘Well, the people voted the tax on.’” Now, I’m not sure that it ever worked quite that well, but it may have worked just barely enough to keep him from being destroyed by it. Because, hell, the bonus passed, and Combs won by, I’ve forgotten what, but it was couple hundred thousand or more. Biggest majority ever obtained up to that time. And—and Clements’ plan just worked exactly. And then he had Wendell Butler out saying—Wendell was named superintendent, elected superintendent—Wendell was out on the stump saying, “One cent for soldier boy and two for sonny boy.” And—and this gave Combs, you know, what was it that Daniel Webster said about—about Alexander Hamilton, said, “He smote the rock of national credit and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth.” Well, Combs smote the rock of the sales tax and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth. And it was a hell of a lot of money hanging over. It didn’t take near as much of the tax for near as long a time to amortize that bond issue as everybody had thought it would. Because the economy started growing, we had this [John F.] Kennedy-[Lyndon] Johnson period of peace and prosperity, or seemingly. And, hell, the money just got bigger and bigger, and the income tax was producing more and more, the gasoline tax was producing more and more, and some of these federal programs were beginning. Oh, they really didn’t come till the mid ’60s. And Combs was the governor of growth, as I said. We—we—we completely revamped and built up our park system. You know, we had had a—a—a primitive park system under Clements, the first one we ever had, and it was a good one. But I mean, you know, it just wasn’t up to what we later attained. We had , and we had Kenlake and , and some parks. But when Bert came in, we built all these parks, they were all built. You know, Ken-, new Kentucky Dam Village, Barkley Lake later on, the lake over there in—in Hopkins County, the Rough River, the—Lake Cumberland Park, the Carter Caves. You know, where you had the parks—the parks we had, but we didn’t have lodges, and they built lodges at all of them, and they built golf courses, and they built— And that is what started Kentucky on the road to being a great tourist state, which it’s been ever since. Combs named Wilson Wyatt to take charge of industrial and economic development, and Wyatt made a few bobbles, you know, he did feel very proud of himself for bringing us that atomic [laughs] dumping ground up there—Hellard:Maxey Flats.
:—Maxey Flats. You know, he just preened himself about that and said, [Hellard
laughs] “It’s going to bring a great nuclear reprocessing industry to .” And of course it’s one of the worst things that ever happened to us, but everybody’s entitled to a mistake, and it was an honest mistake. It was that Jim Neill that sold him on that. And it was a—it—it really was a very silly thing. But a lot of what Wyatt did in industrial and economic development was good, and we—he was in the right time, you know, it was a period of growth, and it was a period of manufacturing growth. You know, we were still having trouble with coal, and never—never had a coal boom during that period, even when the economy was booming. But this was the era and the age when manufacturing plants were going up everywhere, and expanding everywhere, and got more than its share, no question about it, under both Combs and [Ned] Breathitt. And all those things—and they did it without any right-to-work laws, and they did it while improving social legislation. Combs—Combs started to in, you know, sponsor increases in the workman’s compensation benefits, the unemployment benefits, minimum wage, for the first time we had some kind of a state minimum wage. It was what you might call a variant of the Great Society, finally. I mean, you know, that—of course he started before the Great Society came, but it was, Combs was greatly in sympathy emotionally with the Kennedy and Johnson years. Now, Kennedy did not run well in on account of the religious issue, but Combs supported him loyally. Now, you know—so that’s the way I look at the Combs administration. A period of great growth, great progress, we did raise our teachers’ salaries, we started building, we eliminated the one-room school, we started building modern school buildings—some of them had a lot of asbestos in them, but nobody knew that then—and we had a great expansion of all our universities. Bob Martin went to Eastern. We got rid of Frank Peterson at the —Hellard:That was Happy’s big thing.
:Uh-huh. And it was a period when the campuses of our universities were just
building buildings and dormitories all the time and—you know, I—I can’t figure now by numbers what it was, but there was just an enormous and almost unbelievable increase in the enrollments at our colleges and universities.Hellard:Well, how much did—
:The medical center at the of , which was started by , and was under
construction during—Combs finished it and financed it. Now, what did you start to ask?Hellard:How much of, I want to talk with you on education after while, but how
much of the growth on university campuses was due to the strong political personalities of the presidents appointed? Our—our real need—:What I think—
Hellard:—and have ( )
:—I think the real—
Hellard:— ( )
:—I think the real factor that induced the growth was demographic. Hell, you,
you had two things: you had a, you know, a baby boom of unprecedented proportions, and you had an economic boom of unprecedented proportions, and, hell, if you had a lot of prosperous families with kids, the colleges were bound to grow. Now, I’m sure that the political and powerful personalities of these presidents, you know, had something to do with it, but the truth is that that was more a perception. And you must remember this, a lot of that dormitory stuff and these buildings were financed by debt financing, but interest rates were low and, hell, most of it’s paid for now. You know, the debt—the debt of our colleges and universities has been going down, down, down in recent years. And we probably are very lucky that we borrowed all that money at a time of low interest rates, when you had a prime rate of 6 percent. And now I’m sure we expanded in ways we didn’t need to expand. That perhaps came more in Breathitt’s administration when you got into the council and institutional pressures for, for the colleges to become universities and all those things. That was a little later. But the physical growth started and burgeoned during the Combs administration. And I think if there’s another thing, that as I look back on it, you know, has to be admitted, and that is that there was a, a great boost in the morale of this state in that period. People began to feel proud of a little bit. And of course, you know, Combs had a big highway program, too, which helped tourism, and—and—you know, for anything, he was probably a little extravagant about the toll roads, because he—he—he fooled people a little bit, you know. Most of these people thought these toll roads were going to pay for themselves. And the fact is that Wetherby’s original toll road’s the only one that ever paid for itself. The rest of them paid anywhere from 15 or 12 percent up to 25 or 30 percent of their cost out of tolls. But it did provide us with a really, you know, pretty darn good network of, of highways across the state, way beyond what the interstates were going to do, and the interstates were growing, of course, and being built along with it. So I would have to say that, you know, Combs’ administration marked a quantum leap for this state. Now perhaps I am too—too much caught up in it, was too much a part of it. And there were things, you know, there was the truck deal and there were contracts for Bill May, and there were things that you could pick at, but they weren’t the heart of it, you know. They—they were just, you might say, excrescences on it. And the state employees were systematically, I won’t say assessed, but solicited for political contributions, and the campaigns were financed, to a very great extent, by the contributions of state employees, was done in a very systematic way, and that was a, a blot. But nobody at that time thought it was a blot because it’d been being done forever and ever, and it was only later, I really think, for the cleanup of some of those conditions which came later, we have to thank two people—although I might claim a little credit myself for some of the lawsuits I brought—but the main thanks are due to two people: Louie Nunn for his gross excesses, and Wendell Ford for really holding things under restraint when he came in. And this, I believe, would be one of the better high marks for the [Wendell] Ford administration, I don’t want to get up into that now.Hellard:Now, did not Bert Combs introduce the merit system? Or Happy had created
a merit system, had he not, by executive order?:Well, Happy first, in his first administration, he created a merit system by
statute, but it had no teeth in it, it had no way of enforcing itself or being enforced, and it was totally dishonored in practice. Then he tried to create a merit system by executive order after Waterfield had been defeated simply in an effort, fruitless effort, to keep Combs from getting control of the patronage. But Combs ran on a platform of creating a merit system, and he did create a merit system. And the merit system was observed in some ways, that is to say, they conducted the examinations and followed that part of the law. And there weren’t ever any massive firings because Combs and Breathitt were of the same faction of the same party and it wasn’t necessary to fire anybody. I mean, they had their own crowd in, and Combs filled the damn state, you know, he fired all the Chandler people, or a lot of them, not all of them, he fired—he didn’t fire the ones Clements had made deals with, but he, you know, he fired the ones he wanted to get rid of. And then had them all—had the jobs all full by the time the merit system went into effect. So— And yet Combs, in the—in—if you’re looking at it under the eye of history, he was the father of the merit system, and it ultimately became, you know, was tested and succeeded. But it really was only when Ford followed Nunn that it was really put to the test and carried and passed the test. Nunn tried every way in the world and I, you know, I think a lot of those lawsuits I brought saved a lot of employees and got them back their jobs, but that’s—Hellard:Are you talking about the ones you fi-, you filed during Nunn’s administration?
:Uh-huh.
Hellard:Okay.
:And I think that tended to—to help save it. But the thing that really saved it
was when Wendell came in, he didn’t fire all the Nunn employees, he just went ahead and—and left people pretty much alone that were in merit system jobs. And then he did something else—even under Combs, you know, the so-called laborers were not under the merit system, what we used to call the “weed cutters,” and Ford put them under the merit system. So it’s gradually grown, but one’s going to have to say that—that—that Bert Combs was the father of it.Hellard:What about Bert Combs’ attention to day-to-day details of state
government? Was he one for that, or did he generally tend to look at things in the broader scope?:I would say, to use one of his own phrases, “he painted with a broad brush.”
But he was a hardworking governor, and—and he—he—he did not do as Clements did. Clements was a master of every—’course, government was a lot smaller when Clements was there—but Clements knew every detail of what was going on in every department, and Clem-—[End of tape one, side one]
—knew every detail of what was going on in every department, and Clements
associated with the budget analysts just as if they were part of his family. The budget office was really, not legally but in fact, a part of the governor’s staff, and Clements knew every detail of the budget and the finances of the state. Now, Combs had a broad and good knowledge, but he—he didn’t do that. He spent his time going out and preaching the gospel, and, you know, cutting ribbons and dedicating projects and—and selling the sales tax to the people, trying to prove to them that it’d been a good source of revenue for progress in Kentucky.Hellard:Well, who were the people, then, that made government—
:Then—
Hellard:—run?
:—another thing Combs did, you see, with this money. The sales tax put its
greatest burdens on the poor, so Combs used part of that money to improve the payments of welfare mothers and old-age pensioners, we didn’t have the big welfare thing we had later, but we did have the old-age pensioners, and he gave them good increases. What did you say?Hellard:Who were—who were the people in Combs’ administration that actually made
the government run? Who did he count on most to, to see to the day-to-day operation?Prichard:Well, his finance commissioner originally was Bob Martin, his revenue
commissioner was Bill Scent, both very capable, highway commissioner was first Clements and then Henry Ward and Henry— Of course, Clements, we’ll go into that at a later time, but you know the fight, the breach between Combs and Clements that occurred during really the first year of Combs’ administration, and it, it was a severe breach and has never been wholly healed. So when Ward took the place, well, Ward was a major factor. Ward was fractious and you know, he would ultimately do the things that Combs wanted, but he had a great deal of independence. Those were pretty able people.Hellard:Well, what, what part did you play in the Combs administration?
:I was just an unofficial adviser. I used to go up to the mansion, oh, pretty
nearly every Sunday afternoon, and we would sit all afternoon, and maybe till eleven o’clock at night—Secretary:( )
:Yes?
Secretary:Senator Bradley’s calling. [tape turned off and on]
Hellard:What were we talking about?
:Well, I was talking about the—the—
Hellard:Your part.
:—way Combs—what his style of running the government was, wasn’t I?
Hellard:Well, I asked you what your—what—what your—
:I said unofficial adviser.
Hellard:And you used to go to the mansion on Sunday afternoons.
:Yeah. And often during the week he would call me. I was practicing in , you
know, came there to practice in about ’58 or ’9. And many times he’d call me up to his office for meetings, and I would just sit in on, I really sat in on most everything, certainly everything of a policy nature. I didn’t sit in on every patronage matter or everything of that sort, and I was—he always wanted me to work in campaigns. I worked in the Kennedy campaign in 1960 at his request, and I worked in the, later on, the Breathitt campaign, the Wyatt campaign. I spent a great deal of too much time, frankly, in the headquarters in those things. I spent too much in Comb’s campaign. I was there, really, almost uninterruptedly for a year. And it put great strains on my family life, great strains on my finances, and I really was almost insane to do all those things, but I did get caught up in them. And—and I wrote, you know, I wrote most of Combs’ inaugural speech, I wrote most of his state of the state speeches to the legislature, many of his special speeches that he made. We worked together. When I say I wrote them, I don’t mean that he was just a puppet or, or something of that sort. He always had his own input and his own contribution, and he’d make changes. We’d work together on them. But I nearly always did the initial draft.Hellard:What about on appointments? Did you have any influence there?
:Yeah, some. He had his own thoughts and all that, but I, yes, I had—
Hellard:But I’m thinking, again, specifically about college presidents. Did he
not appoint Dr. Martin? Or is that Breathitt?:No, that was Combs. He—he—I won’t say he appointed him, but the—the board
appointed him early in Comb’s administration. He was Combs’ first finance commissioner. And I always believe that the deal was cut, in a sense, during the campaign. You see, he had been Combs’ campaign manager in the primary. And then after the Combs-Wyatt merger, he and David Francis became co-chairmen. And I’ve always believed that that deal was cut, probably with Clements’ blessing, and I was not a major party to that. I—I knew about it. I had—I—I was responsible for Scent’s being revenue commissioner, for example. I was trying to think what else I had a major impact in on appointments. That was one I remember very much.Hellard:Maybe on the university presidents?
:Oh, not really. I don’t think Combs— You know, Oswald was named during the
concluding part of Combs’ administration, but Combs didn’t pick him. Combs just got rid of—in ref-, effect, got rid of [Frank G.] Dickey by getting rid of Peterson. And Dickey felt that he’s losing the confidence, maybe, of the board, and he quit. But Oswald was chosen by a bona fide selection process. I’m trying to think who else was appointed in Combs’ administration. You see, [Adron] Doran was a holdover. See, who was the president down at Western [] then? ( ), oh, well, Kelly Thompson, and he was a holdover.Hellard:Did Combs have much interest in higher education? Of course, as, as you
point out, it was a period of growth, but I take it that growth was somewhat inevitable it was—it was—:Yeah.
Hellard:—spurred by him.
:But I think Combs had a real interest in it. I don’t think he tried to—to run
the universities. I think he felt that, I think he really felt that wasn’t appropriate. I never saw, you know, the—the—the la-—two governors that I think of that really tried to run the universities were Happy and Louie Nunn. When Happy was governor, the second time, he was trying to fire Dr. Woods down at Murray [State University] and Martin, as superintendent of public instruction, was then ex-officio on the board of every one of the so-called teachers colleges, and Martin blocked every effort by Happy to get rid of people. And, you know, Doran went in. Now, Wetherby had a lot to do with picking people in his time. Wetherby was very political in—in his attitude toward the colleges. Wetherby got Kelly Thompson appointed. And Clements, you know, had him a candidate and Clements couldn’t prevail. He had Carlos Oakley. Wendell Butler was a candidate. But Wetherby held their feet to the fire and got Kelly Thompson put in primarily because Wetherby had in his entourage a little group of people who were graduates of Western and who loved Kelly Thompson. You know, people like Field McChesney and, oh, Mack Sisk, and people like that and they—and then Bob Pierce was pretty close to Wetherby, them practicing law in Frankfort, and Bob was Kelly’s brother-in-law. Clements, I mean Wetherby, certainly was responsible for the appointment of Adron Doran at Morehead []. had been speaker of the house under Clements and Wetherby. And he had originally been a supporter of Harry Lee Waterfield against Clements, but Clements took him into camp, took him over. And after he was speaker, they gave him a job in the Department of Education, he took his doctorate, and when a vacancy occurred at Morehead, Wetherby, I guess it was Wetherby by that time, greased him in. Now, Dr. Woods had been appointed way back in the—I believe in the Willis administration.Hellard:Well, during this time, was there much—much attention paid to the
[University] issue?:Well—
Hellard:Or was it always just a kind of quiet issue that recently—
:No. The—the first time that it got to be a live issue was during the, some of
the civil rights demonstrations up in the mid ’60s, ’63, somewhere along in there. I believe they burnt a building and there was a fire out there. And Van Curen wrote a mean editorial in the State Journal advocating that it be closed and turned over to a place for retarded children—he had a retarded son, you know—and that was a, created a big stink. And they—when Dr. [Rufus B.] Atwood retired, Combs stepped in and saved the college and—and there was a lot of political people, like Frank Stanley, wanted it and people like that. And Combs promised the alumni that he would see that they had a respectable president and they chose Dr. Hill. Now, he wasn’t a political appointment, but he was a, you know, Dr. Hill was a reputable person. Now that was the first ruckus about that I remember.Hellard:During the Combs years, as, as your influence grew as an adviser to the
governor, what was your relationship with the press? I assume you were improving it all the time, but did Combs ever ask you to intercede on it with editorial writers, or reporters, or media people?:Oh, not really. I didn’t have to be asked. And, and really, most of my
relationship with the press came more from the press than from me. They would call me. And I really, you know, I—I just—at the earlier stages, I wasn’t that much involved with the press. I was some. I mean, Dick Harwood was a friend of mine. I got to know the press during the campaign, really. And I did have a personal relationship with Barry Bingham and Mark Ethridge and— But for example, take Allan Trout, who was then in the bureau. Alan and I were good friends, and he and my father were friends during the years my father was in the legislature, and Allan married a woman from , but I wouldn’t have said that I had much influence on anything Allan wrote. He would write about me sometimes because he kind of liked me. And I knew Hugh Morris pretty well, but Hugh was pretty independent. I would say that it really wasn’t until Breathitt became governor that I really had a real close relationship and—and communication on an almost daily basis with the press. But—Hellard:Why—what do you attribute your—your—you—you’re greatly admired by—by
most of the people that I know in the press. And I, I assume that’s for your candor and your—and being a good source of information. But, you know one had—:But, you know, a lot of the information that I’ve been a source of, Vic, wasn’t
leaks that I picked up inside the administration. It was more being able to analyze the situation and predict what was likely to happen, and a sort of sense I had of who was doing what and who wanted what and who was trying—I mean, I didn’t really— You know, I suspect that Combs, particularly, tended to feel that I was getting too close to the press, you know, because if Combs figured that I was somewhat independent and on some things, I might not just totally follow the party line. And I think that’s why the press had some—put some credence in me. And—Hellard:Let’s talk about—
Prichard:—it was only after Ned [Breathitt] got in that I really had the
constant communication with them and in that point, you know, Ned—Ned knew everything I was doing, and if I—if I broke away from the party line a little bit, he didn’t care and was kind of proud of me.Hellard:Well, what about the—the presidential election of 1960? We talked a
little bit about ’s attempt to maintain control of the party—:Yeah.
Hellard:—but what—what—
:In 1960?
Hellard:Yeah.
:Well, it was a total failure. He—he didn’t get anywhere. That was when we had
that big ruckus in . And it was my opinion that we beat him right there in that courthouse. Now he gaveled us down, and wouldn’t recognize us to make any motions, and we walked out and had our own meeting and we were seated at the state convention. Now, I’m sure we’d have been seated whether we had the most or not, uh-huh, you know, that was the practice [Hellard laughs] in those days, they—Hellard:We felt the same way.
:Huh?
Hellard:[laughing] We felt the same way.
:What do you mean?
Hellard:That you would be seated no matter what.
:Well, yeah. But the truth is that I think we had the most people there.
Hellard:Want a cigar?
:I think we had the most people there. And the—and the real thing that convinced
me of that, is that—is that wouldn’t let us have a count. And if he was confident that he had a majority, the easiest thing in the world would have been to have everybody line up with tellers. And, you know, he wouldn’t even allow us to put a nomination in for chairman of the meeting. He came up there with a big gavel, one of those great big triple-sized gavels, and poor Miss Lilah, you remember, she called it to order. She wasn’t the chairman, but she was the secretary, and I’ve forgotten who the chairman was, and—Hellard:Well, Happy was the chairman.
:I guess he was the chairman of the committee. And then they nominated Portwood
for chairman of the convention. And Dan was running around like a monkey [Hellard laughs] hollering, “Out of order, out of order, out of order.” And the truth is that, you know, if Happy had had the majority, there would be no reason on earth not to let us have a count. And—and the reason that the committee, you know, they didn’t have to cheat to give us our seats, because we simply testified what was the fact and it was undisputed. And Portwood sat there and never denied it that we were not allowed to—to put any motions or to ask for tellers.Hellard:Do you recall how you—how you made your exit from that courtroom?
:Oh, I said something about “Everybody that loves the Democratic Party, follow
me,” or something like that, and we walked out in the—in the rotunda and had our convention. Bob Montgomery and I were kind of—wasn’t Bob there that day?Hellard:Bob—Bob was there, Harvey Jones—
:And the Joneses—
Hellard:— C. M. Perkins—
:—the Joneses, C. M. Perkins. And they came to my house one night and they all
had a bunch of these funeral director’s chairs and filled up our two parlors there, and it must have been thirty or forty of them sitting there, and they asked me if I would handle the parliamentary side of it. You know, I didn’t start out—and Combs didn’t want me to— See, Combs, in the early part of his administration, was a little sensitive about any publicity that I got because he thought that there was still a hangover from my troubles and that that might not look so good. And Combs had a little equivocal, you know, he liked me, no question about that, and trusted me, but he thought that I ought to observe long season of silence maybe. And he—he really got upset when he heard that I was going to do this, but I wouldn’t stop. I’d promised these fellows I’d do it and— But I’ll tell you this, all my friends in the Combs and Clements faction just loved it. And—and when we went to the state convention, Combs’ attitude had changed by then, and, hell, we—Lawrence Grauman was chairman of the credentials committee and he just seated us. And was a pretty honorable fellow now. He wasn’t the fellow you’d have that was going to just rule you in regardless of the merits and—Hellard:My recollection is that you got up on the bench—
:Hell, I’d—
Hellard:—Because the courthouse was packed, courtroom was packed.
:That’s right.
Hellard:That was—
:Oh, hell, it was full.
Hellard:—that was my first recollection of you, was seeing this large man get up
on that bench and point your finger to the sky and say, “All who love or obey the rules of the Democratic Party, follow me.”:That could be.
Hellard:And there upon, Jack Corman, by the window, started yelling, “Get the
hell out of here. [laughs] —:Uh-huh.
Hellard:—Get the hell out of here.”
:I remember Jack was saying that, but I had—
Hellard:But I take it that that was the case all over Ken-, parts of , wasn’t it?
:Yeah. But Jack and I never had any real altercation or anything. He was there,
I remember that, and they—they made Portwood the chairman of the convention and—and Happy wouldn’t recognize anybody. You know, that’s just clearly a violation of the party rules.Hellard:Well, he—he wouldn’t represent D., recognize D. L. Thornton after you
left, either. You want to light that?:What did David want to do?
Hellard:David? Well, I forget what. It was some kind of motion he wanted to make—
:Uh-huh.
Hellard:—and Happy talked to him like a schoolboy.
:Which side was David on?
Hellard:Well, he was—he stayed with the people, so I guess that’s—that’s where
he wanted to be.:That’s sort—
Hellard:Of course—
:—that’s sort of inconsistent with David’s high principles, wasn’t it?
Hellard:Well, he—I—I never realized he was all that consistent. Of course, I
didn’t know him that well.:Well, you know, he was very religious, very dry, big Methodist, and I never
thought of Mr. Thornton as being a kind of a political politician, really.Hellard:Well, I don’t think he really was. I don’t think he really was. I
don’t—I don’t know why he was there that day, except the people had made every effort to get everybody they could there.:Uh-huh. So did we. I remember, for instance, I called Mr. Ralph Mills, you
know, he was living on that farm out on the Frankfort Pike. And his manager, I forget who it was now, was on our side. And he was going to bring all the men from the farm. But he didn’t want to do it unless Mr. Mills agreed to it, which I don’t blame him for. So they delegated me, and I went to Mr. Mills. Of course, had been good to him. made him rich back during World War II, when was on the Military Affairs Committee and got him all those contracts to build bases and that was the foundation of his fortune. But by that time, was out, and Mr. Mills was looking to the future. So I went to see him, and I didn’t say anything about that, I just said, “Mr. Mills, I’d like to ask you a favor.” I said, “Your manager would like to help us bring some of the boys from the farm into this convention and to help us, and he doesn’t want to do it unless it’s all right with you.” He said, “Of course it’s all right with me.” And we had quite a few there. General Lloyd was there, you remember that?Hellard:Yes, indeed.
:And all the Jones crowd was there, hell, everyone of them—Matt and Nat—
Hellard:.
:—Harvey and Ambrose, Jess. I don’t guess old man Gardner, was he there?
Hellard:No, no.
:Didn’t think so.
Hellard:I think he—I think he was right, right ill at that time.
:That’s right. But, you know, in the early days, I had a rather close
relationship with the Joneses. Not only were they Combs people, but Mr. Gardner Jones, you know, came to Woodford County from Bourbon, where he was—raised tobacco on the Simms Farm. And he and my father had a long friendship, and and them always thought my father was a great person. And so we had a close relationship at that time, that was ’fore we got split up on some of these environmental matters, and—and Harvey and I still personally get along fine, you know. It’s pretty hard to dislike in a lot of ways. Don’t you think so?Hellard:Yes, it is. I agree.
:And one time I went ’fore the planning commission and—protesting about
something or other— 1:00